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Looking at the World Bank’s safeguard reform through the lens of deliberative 
democracy  
Abstract  
The sheer amount of non-state participation in the creation of the World Bank 
Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) is surely noteworthy. The aim of the 
Bank’s consultation was to get ‘global’ input and feedback, and with over 8,000 
stakeholders from over 63 countries taking part, it is laudable. The extent of the 
participation challenges the positivist approach to international law-making, which 
views only states as having the power to make law and raises questions about how to 
legitimise such international soft-law making. Legitimacy is entangled with democracy, 
as scholars debate whether democracy is the required benchmark for decision-making 
processes at international organisations. This article uses deliberative democracy to 
analyse the ESF consultation process. Whilst, democratic legitimacy has been 
interpreted to mean inclusivity and participation, deliberative democracy raises a 
series of hard questions about equality and power that scholarship on global 
governance needs to grapple with. Although this participatory process at the World 
Bank challenges traditional narratives in international law, analysing it through a lens 
of deliberative democracy exposes the work that still needs to be done to discuss 
democracy in international decision-making.  
 
Keywords: Consultation processes, Deliberative Democracy, The World Bank, 
Environmental and Social Framework, International Organisations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The adoption of the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) on 4th August 2016 
was the result of the ‘most extensive consultation ever conducted by the World Bank’.1 
Across a four-year period, the World Bank engaged with governments, experts, 
indigenous peoples, and civil society groups (CSOs). The breadth of participation in 
the consultation process was coupled with live-streaming of events and online 
discussions on social media platforms.2 The aim of the Bank’s consultation was to get 
‘global’ input and feedback,3 and with over 8,000 stakeholders from over 63 countries 
taking part, the consultation is laudable. The attempts to engage non-state actors, and 
the attitude of transparency that facilitated world-wide engagement, are symptomatic 
of the legitimatisation of decision-making at international organisations, which is 
advocated for by scholars.4 Ideas of participation, inclusion and transparency have 
                                                            
1 World Bank, ‘World Bank Board Approves New Environmental and Social 
Framework’, 4 August 2016, available at www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2016/08/04/world-bank-board-approves-new-environmental-and-social-
framework  
2 For example, World Bank Live, ‘Global Live Chat: Review and Update of the World 
Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies’, 8 March 2016. For civil society 
examples, Human Rights Watch, ‘World Bank: Dangerous Rollback in Environmental, 
Social Protection. New Framework Undermines President Kim’s Commitment to “No 
Dilution”’, 4 August 2015, available at www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/04/world-bank-
dangerous-rollback-environmental-social-protections; U. Khatri, ‘World Bank’s New 
Environmental and Social Framework is a Huge Step Backward for Human Rights’, 
Earth Rights International, 17 August 2016, available at 
www.earthrights.org/blog/world-banks-new-environmental-and-social-framework-
huge-step-backward-human-rights; D. Hill, ‘The UK must fight for better World Bank 
environment policy’, The Guardian, 19 February 2015, available at 
www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2015/feb/19/uk-must-fight-
better-world-bank-environment-policy 
3 World Bank, ‘The World Bank’s Safeguard Policies Proposed Review and Update: 
Approach Paper’, 10 October 2012, at para 45 
4 See for example, T. Kleinlein, ‘Non-state actors from an international 
constitutionalism perspective: Participation matters!’, in J. d’Aspremont (ed.), 
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been offered as markers of legitimacy, but have an elusive relationship with 
democracy.5 This article considers the ESF through the lens of deliberative democracy 
to expose the types of debates and questions that should underpin a discussion on 
democracy in international decision-making. 
 
The ESF is the new framework that applies to World Bank investment projects, and it 
seeks to protect environmental and human rights interests as well as strive for 
sustainable development. The ESF includes instructions for Bank Staff, as well as 
other national or international funding agencies,6 and it includes ‘standards’ or norms, 
which are mandatory requirements for borrowing countries and projects.7 The Bank 
argues that the ESF promotes sustainable borrower institutions,8 but the Framework 
has been criticised for giving too much decision-making power to the borrowing 
countries, rather than generating rules for the borrowing countries to comply with.9  
 
The normative nature and the implications of the ESF demand that the framework is 
considered legitimate by those affected by it,10 but the literature is divided on whether 
                                                            
Participation in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State 
Actors in International Law (2011), 40 at 40 
5 See for example, A. Buchanan, ‘Political Legitimacy and Democracy’, (2002) 1112(4) 
Ethics 689; A. Buchanan and R. O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions’, (2006) 20(4) Ethics and International Affairs 405 
6 The World Bank Environmental and Social Policy for Investment Project Financing 
7 The Environmental and Social Standards 
8 World Bank, The Environmental and Social Framework (2017), at ix  
9 For example, Human Rights Watch, supra note 2; Khatri, supra note 2 
10 For a discussion on whether it is just law, soft law or other norms that require 
legitimacy see, S. Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’, in S. Besson 
and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (2010), 163 at 173; M. 
Goldmann, ‘We need to cut off the head of the king: past, present and future 
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democracy is the requisite standard of legitimacy in international decision-making. On 
the one hand, decision-making within international legal governance is increasingly 
being held against a so-called ‘democratic’ standard by academics and civil society.11 
On the other hand, scholars make deliberate choices to separate ideas of participation, 
inclusion, accountability and transparency from the transfer of democracy from the 
nation-state to international governance.12 Keenly aware of the opposition to 
transferring state-based models of democracy to international institutions, scholars, 
such as Dryzek, argue that deliberative democracy is a more appropriate model for 
global governance.13 Multi-stakeholder consultation processes in international 
decision-making have been explained as exercises of deliberative democracy.14 
Building on these debates on the legitimisation of global governance, this article 
unpacks deliberative democracy and uses it to analyse the World Bank ESF 
consultation process.  
                                                            
approaches to international soft law’, (2012) Leiden Journal of International Law 335, 
at 364-365 
11 A. Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (2009), 263; J. P. Trachtman, ‘Constitutional 
Economics of the World Trade Organization’ in J. L Dunoff and J. P Trachtman (eds.), 
Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance 
(2009), 206; A. O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (2014) 
12 For example, M. Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the 
relationship between constitutionalism in and beyond the state’ in J. L. Dunoff and J. 
P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and 
Global Governance (2009), 260; Buchanan and Keohane, supra note 5. 
13 J. S. Dryzek (with S. Niemeyer), Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative 
Governance (2013), at 177. See also R. Higgott and E. Erman, ‘Deliberative global 
governance and the question of legitimacy: what can we learn from the WTO?’, (2010) 
36 Review of International Studies 449, at 454; H. Stevenson and J. S. Dryzek, ‘The 
legitimacy of multilateral climate governance: a deliberative democratic approach’, 
(2012) 6(1) Critical Policy Studies 1, at 2 
14 See J. S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy & Public 
Consultation (2011), at 33-43; W. Martens, B. wan der Linden, and M. Wörsdörfer, 
‘How to Assess the Democratic Qualities of a Multi-stakeholder Initiative from a 
Habermasian Perspective? Deliberative Democracy and the Equator Principles 
Framework’, (2017) Journal of Business Ethics 1 
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Deliberative democracy can be said to include four components, which are: a demos 
constituted according to social relations rather than territory; an informal public sphere; 
deliberation; and, an act of decision-making. There is much overlap between the public 
sphere, deliberation and decision-making, given that the importance of the public 
sphere lies in its communication of interests, views and concerns to formal decision-
making processes.15 For the purposes of this article, three components will be 
extrapolated: the demos, deliberation and the act of making a decision. Deliberative 
democracy is critiqued for ignoring power-dynamics and homogenising the demos.16 
Thus, to discuss deliberative democracy requires an understanding of its component 
parts and the critiques. The ‘global’ scope of the consultation, to the extent that it is 
suggestive of world-wide participation, can be praised for its inclusion and 
participation. But, as will be explored in this article, breadth of participation is not 
sufficient to amount to an exercise in deliberative democracy, which requires genuine 
connections between the demos, deliberation, and the act of decision-making.  
 
This article will discuss the deliberative qualities of the World Bank consultation 
process using publicly available World Bank reports of the proceedings and the 
uploaded consultation submissions.17 These reports give a sense of who participated 
                                                            
15 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1996), at 375. Cf. J. S. Dryzek, 
Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World (2006), at 
47 
16 I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (2000), at 81 and 108; A. Phillips, Feminism 
and Politics (2009), at 143 
17 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies’, available 
at www.consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-
safeguard-policies 
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and through what channels, and the Bank provides commentary on what they took 
into account and how they responded to comments from participants. However, relying 
on these summaries of the consultation meetings has its weaknesses: Chatham 
House rules are used, which makes it difficult to recapture how stakeholders were 
participating and to ascertain if certain participants had greater leverage or dominance 
in meetings; some of the documentation is incomplete, with lists of participants not 
uploaded or in some cases no documentation is provided;18 and although there are 
sporadic transcriptions of ‘Feedback’ sessions that give insight into the format of 
meetings, these findings cannot be generalised across the consultation process. Using 
only the available summaries does limit what inferences can be made about the 
deliberative quality of the consultation, but a picture of the proceedings emerges. 
 
Reading international decision-making exercises, such as the World Bank’s 
consultation process, through the lens of deliberative democracy can uncover the 
difficult questions that international scholarship still needs to grapple with when 
discussing democracy in international decision-making.19 This article considers the 
consultation process leading up to the adoption of the ESF from the perspective of 
deliberative democracy. The first part of the article provides an overview of the reform 
process. The second part of the article briefly explores the requirements for 
deliberative democracy and critiques of this model of democracy, which are then used 
to analyse the consultation process in the third part of the article. In this third part, the 
                                                            
18 For example, there is often no documentation for meetings with development 
partners in Phase 1, and sometimes documentation for government meetings in Phase 
1 are missing. Some participant lists are missing from consultations with civil society 
and multi-stakeholder meetings in Phase 2.  
19 For example, the instrumental and functional approach adopted by Buchanan and 
Keohane, supra note 5 
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article will discuss both the types of participants and the quality of the deliberations. It 
draws on examples from indigenous peoples and human rights issues to demonstrate 
potential gaps in the consultation process.  
 
 
2. The World Bank ESF and the Consultation Process 
 
The ESF, approved in 2016, and implemented in October 2018, includes a series of 
standards to protect people and the environment from the effects of development 
projects that are financed by the World Bank. The ESF is comprised of a Vision for 
Sustainable Development, the World Bank Environment and Social Policy for 
Investment Project Financing (which outlines mandatory requirements for the Bank) 
and the Environmental and Social Standards (which set out mandatory requirements 
for Borrowers and projects, and in particular they outline the requirements for 
Borrowers when identifying and assessing environmental and social risks and impacts 
arising from investment projects). The ESF guides the deliberations on financing 
agreements between the World Bank and other entities, as well as governs the 
oversight and implementation of projects. There are ten Environmental and Social 
standards (ESS): assessment an management of Environmental and Social Risks and 
Impacts; Labour and Working Conditions; Resource Efficiency an Pollution Prevention 
and Management; Community Health and Safety; Land, Acquisition, Restrictions on 
Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement; Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable 
Management of Living Natural Resources; Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African 
Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities; Cultural Heritage; Financial 
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Intermediaries; and, Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure. 
Compliance with the ESF is ensured by the Inspection Panel and the Independent 
Evaluation Group.  
 
The ESF is criticised for weakening protections in certain aspects.20 Rather than a 
rules-based approach, the ESF favours the national laws of borrowing countries, with 
academic and civil society actors criticising the relaxed approach adopted by the 
Bank.21 Whether this was a result of deferring too heavily to the interests of Borrowing 
states or the outcome of balancing poverty reduction and profits,22 it highlights how 
potentially the interests of community groups and civil society actors were less 
influential in discussions. This section will elaborate on the specific features of the 
World Bank consultation process.  
 
Reform of the Environmental and Social safeguards was a long process,23 with years 
of consultation and stakeholder participation. In the Bank’s discussions on the reform 
process, the scale of participation and depth of consultation are key.24 Across the four 
year period the Bank consulted with: Member Countries, known as shareholders; 
                                                            
20 See E. Hey, ‘International and the Anthropocene’, (2016) 5(10) ESIL 1, at 4 
21 M. Alamgir, M. J. Campbell, S. Sloan, M. Goosem, G. R. Clements, M. I. Mahmoud, 
W. F. Laurance, ‘Economic, Socio-Political and Environmental Risks of Road 
Development in the Tropics’, (2017) 27 Current Biology Review 1130, at 1134; B. 
Sovacool, ‘Cooperative or Inoperative? Accountability and Transparency at the World 
Bank’s Inspection Panel’, (2017) Case Studies in the Environment 1, at 6 
22 Sovacool, supra note 21, at 6 
23 Independent Evaluation Group, ‘Safeguards and Sustainability Policies in a 
Changing World: An Independent Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience’ (2010)  
24 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies’, supra note 
17 
9 
 
development partners, such as the EU, the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, as well 
as a meeting with the Japan International Cooperation Agency;25 international 
organisations, including the International Labour Organization, the United Nations, 
and the United Nations Development Programme; selected experts; and, various 
stakeholders, which includes indigenous peoples, academics, CSOs, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). The Bank held consultation meetings with and 
read submissions from states, indigenous peoples, stakeholders, and ‘project-affected 
communities’.26 Furthermore, the reform process sparked an online discourse as 
academics and specialists provided commentary on the process and substance of the 
ESF.27 
 
In the run up to the consultation process, various stakeholders were incorporated into 
the review of the Environmental and Social safeguards and possible reforms. The 
Independent Evaluation Group carried out an assessment of the safeguards and sort 
feedback from a variety of stakeholders.28 In the World Bank’s Approach Paper, which 
                                                            
25 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social 
Safeguard Policies. Phase 3 Feedback Summary (Tokyo, Japan)’, 2 February 2016 
26 P. Dann and M. Riegner, ‘World Bank Group Safeguard Review: A New Gold 
Standard for Global Environment and Social Protection?’ (forthcoming) 
27 N. Sinani, ‘World Bank Must Priotize Genuine Citizen Engagement’, Huffington Post, 
8 December 2016, available at www.huffingtonpost.com/nezir-sinani/world-bank-
must-prioritiz_b_11400318.html; M. Petersmann, ‘The latest World Bank 
Environmental and Social Framework: progress on fair and equitable benefit-sharing? 
(Part 1)’, Benelex Blog, 12 July 2017, available at 
www.benelexblog.law.ed.ac.uk/2017/07/12/the-latest-world-bank-environmental-and-
social-framework-progress-on-fair-and-equitable-benefit-sharing-part-i/; University of 
Exeter, ‘Exeter researcher guest of World Bank’, 20 October 2016, available at 
www.socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/law/newsandevents/news/articles/exeterresearcher
guestofwor.php 
28 Independent Evaluation Group, supra note 23  
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was a starting point for the consultation process, there are indications that 
stakeholders had input into its content. Paragraph 35 of the Approach Paper states 
‘[s]ome stakeholders have requested the Bank to consider in the review and update 
process a number of areas that are not addressed under the current set of safeguard 
policies’.29 These areas include: ‘human rights, labor and occupational health and 
safety, gender, disability, the free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous Peoples, 
land tenure and natural resources, and climate change’.30 Whilst, it is unclear which 
stakeholders had input,31 and how this input was collected, it is laudable that 
stakeholders had input into the agenda, which would shape the consultation process. 
Moreover, the Approach Paper was opened to consultation. In Annex A of the 
Approach Paper, the Bank lists Consultation Questions that are open-ended and 
facilitate stakeholder-led reforms. In these questions, the Bank asks for additional 
factors and examples that should be considered in the reform.32 The Bank therefore 
appreciates that stakeholders had different perspectives on the shape of reform,33 
perspectives that might have been excluded in the initial drafting of the Bank’s 
approach to reform.  
 
                                                            
29 World Bank, ‘The World Bank’s Safeguard Policies Proposed Review and Update: 
Approach Paper’, 10 October 2012, para 35 
30 ibid 
31 The Terms of Reference for Indigenous Peoples outlines that the Bank held ‘pre-
dialogue meetings with Indigenous Peoples to gather their input and ideas on best 
ways for engagement on the safeguards review’. World Bank, ‘World Bank 
Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies Review and Update: Regional Dialogue 
with Indigenous Peoples: Terms of Reference’ (2013)  
32 World Bank ‘The World Bank’s Safeguard Policies Proposed Review and Update: 
Approach Paper’, 10 October 2012, Annex A, at 17 
33 ibid, para 35 
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The World Bank consultation on the ESF was divided into three phases. Phase 1 saw 
consultations with stakeholders on the approach of the new safeguards.34 An 
approach paper was prepared by the World Bank and opened for public consultation.35 
Phase 1 focused on ten thematic areas: areas for improvement, implementation, 
sustainable development and disabilities, labour and occupational health and safety, 
human rights, land tenure and natural resources, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent 
(FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples, gender, and climate change.36 These Phase 1 
consultations reached more than 2,000 stakeholders from over 40 countries.37 The 
Bank state that it received 81 position papers.38 In this Phase there were 73 
consultation events.39 As part of this phase, the Bank also held expert focus groups 
on Gender, Human Rights, Climate Change, Disability, Labour and Occupational 
Health and Safety, FPIC of Indigenous Peoples, and Land Tenure and Natural 
Resources, as well as sixteen dedicated dialogues with indigenous peoples.  
 
Phase 2 included the release by the World Bank Board’s Executive Committee on 
Development and Effectiveness (CODE) of a ‘Proposal Document’ that was open for 
consultation for three months.40 During this phase, the Bank held 88 events with 
                                                            
34 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Environmental and Social 
Safeguard Policies: Consultation Plan’, 22 December 2012  
35 World Bank, ‘The World Bank’s Safeguard Policies: Proposed Review and Update. 
Approach Paper’,10 October 2012 
36 World Bank ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies. 
Environmental and Social Framework (Proposed Third Draft)’, 4 August 2016, at 9 
37 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies’, supra note 
17 
38 World Bank ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies. 
Environmental and Social Framework (Proposed Third Draft)’, 4 August 2016, at 9 
However, there are only 58 submissions clearly identified as submissions and made 
available online. 
39 Where an “event” might include more than one meeting. 
40 World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Framework: Setting Standards for 
Sustainable Development. First Draft for Consultation’, 30 July 2014 
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government representations and different stakeholders, which included video 
conferences, as well as two online consultations. There was an online forum where 
stakeholders could submit feedback,41 and the Bank documents 136 received 
submissions during Phase 2. There were expert focus groups on, Managing Social 
Risk, Non-discrimination, Labour, two groups on Cultural Heritage, and two on 
Biodiversity, as well as eight consultation meetings with indigenous peoples. In Phase 
2, countries were selected by the Bank to participate to ensure the balanced 
representation of middle- and low-income economies.42  
 
Phase 3 was more concerned with the implementation of the proposed ESF. This 
Phase included a three-month consultation on a revised draft of the proposed ESF,43 
and on the ‘indicative list of outstanding issues’ drawn up by the Bank.44 The Executive 
Directors requested that the focus of the consultation was on ‘implementability from a 
borrower perspective’, which meant that consultations focused on ‘government 
officials and project implementation units in borrowing countries’.45 The Bank 
convened 72 meetings, 3 online consultations, and received 92 submissions. There 
were focus groups on Religious concerns, Financial intermediaries, Indigenous 
people, Non-discrimination, Ensuring Environmental and Social Integrity, and Labour. 
                                                            
41 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Environmental and Social 
Safeguard Policies. Plan for Consultations with External Stakeholders for Phase 2 of 
the Policy Review and Update’, August 2014, at 2 
42 Ibid, at 3 
43 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies’, supra note 
17  
44 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies. 
Environmental and Social Framework (Proposed Third Draft)’, 4 August 2016, at 11 
45 Ibid 
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At each phase of the consultation, the Bank writes a reply to demonstrate how 
comments are taken into account.46  
 
Throughout the consultation process, there were divergences in relation to certain 
issues between the borrowing countries and civil society participants and donor 
countries. On issues such as: land acquisition and involuntary resettlement; FPIC of 
Indigenous Peoples; Labour issues including those with brokers, agents and other 
intermediaries; non-discrimination; and, biodiversity conservation, the borrowing 
countries were concerned with respecting national laws.47 Whilst donor countries and 
civil society called for strong FPIC for Indigenous Peoples, ‘Borrowers in Africa and in 
Latin America were also concerned that FPIC could be interpreted as having a veto 
function’.48 In relation to human rights, it was predominantly the donor countries and 
civil society participants that called for the incorporation of human rights into the ESF, 
with borrowing countries ‘noting conflicts with the World Bank’s mandate’ and the 
identity of the Bank as a reason not to incorporate international human rights.49  
 
The tensions between the various actors and the fundamental differences of opinion 
on crucial issues highlight some of the challenges when talking about deliberative 
democracy within international decision-making. The next section outlines the types 
of debates that a lens of deliberative democracy necessitates.  
                                                            
46 World Bank, ‘The World Bank’s Safeguard Policies Proposed Review and Update: 
Approach Paper’, 10 October 2012, at 14 
47 See World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies. 
Environmental and Social Framework (Proposed Third Draft)’, 4 August 2016, at 11, 
19, 22, 30, and 36 
48 Ibid, at 37 
49 Ibid, at 19 
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3. Deliberative Democracy  
 
Deliberative democracy is a process of decision-making where relevant actors join to 
debate common issues. Within deliberative democracy, the needs and interests of 
each participant are taken into account and treated equally,50 provided such interests 
are communicated through reasoned arguments.51 Within the deliberative model there 
are two spheres; the informal and the formal. The informal is characterised by debates 
amongst the people. The formal sphere refers to state-based, public institutions of 
decision-making, such as assemblies. The informal discussions between civil society 
actors should be fed into the formal decision-making processes.52 Habermas’ theory 
of deliberative democracy can be deconstructed into four overlapping component 
parts: the demarcation of the people, the public sphere, deliberation, and decision-
making. Theorists of deliberative democracy stress the efficacy of the public sphere, 
emphasising that debates within the public sphere must influence decision-making.53 
Given this, this article focuses on three aspects: the demos, deliberation, and the act 
of making a decision. These aspects of deliberative democracy can be used and 
critiqued to analyse the World Bank consultation process.  
                                                            
50 T. McCarthy, ‘Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas 
in Dialogue’, (1994) 195(1) Ethics 44, at 55 
51 See J. Cohen, ‘Reflections on Habermas on Democracy’, (1999) 12(4) Ratio Juris 
385, at 399-400 
52 Habermas, supra note 15, at 352; N. Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A 
Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’, (1990) 25/26 Social Text 
56, at 75 
53 Habermas, supra note 15, at 375; Fraser, supra note 52, at 75 
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3.1 Constructing a Demos 
 
Debates abound within deliberative democratic theory about the appropriate criterion 
for demarcating demoi. The all-affected principle is criticised for being too broad,54 and 
the all-subjected principle is considered too narrow.55 As the all-subjected principle 
refers to ‘those who are subject to a given governance structure’,56 it is not appropriate 
in this case where there is a soft-law mechanism that regulates negotiations of finance 
agreements and the distinction between governed and governor is missing.57 At its 
broadest, the all-affected principle refers to ‘all and only those who are affected by a 
decision’.58 The utility of the ‘all-affected’ approach for global governance is that the 
demos is fluid and constructed as and when there are decisions to be made.59 
 
The meaning of ‘all-affected’ is contested, with scholars debating the threshold 
requirements. Some have argued for ‘fundamental interests’ as a limit, others consider 
the extent to which interests are affected.60 Important interests within global 
                                                            
54 N. Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimaging Political Space in a Globalizing World 
(2010), at 64 
55 S. Näsström, ‘The Challenge of the All-Affected Principle’, (2011) 59 Political 
Studies 166, at 117 
56 Fraser, supra note 54, at 65. See also L. Valentini, ‘No Global Demos, No Global 
Democracy? A Systematization and Critique’, (2014) 12(4) Perspectives on Politics 
789, at 792 
57 Näsström, supra note 55, at 117 and 123 
58 Valentini, supra note 56, at 793 
59 S. Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (2010), at 325 
60 See R. E. Goodin, ‘Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives’, (2007) 
35(1) Philosophy & Public Affairs 40, at 51 
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governance might range from human rights61 to financial stakes. Financial decision-
making at an international level can affect ‘creditor institutions, debtor governments, 
investors in global financial markets, and residents’.62 Constructing an ‘all-affected’ 
demos within international decision-making is ‘complicated’ because of the range of 
actors with competing interests.63 Scholarship on deliberative global governance has 
included NGOs, activists, journalists, corporations, members of governments and 
international organisations within the public sphere.64  
 
Theories of deliberative democracy are predicated on consensus and have 
traditionally assumed a homogenous polity.65 Feminist scholars critique the lack of 
equality within demoi that are presented as homogenous groups. Habermas’ 
bourgeois public sphere is predicated on the idea that the participants were social 
equals, but this is an assumption that effectively works to bracket the participants’ 
differences in gender, race and class.66 Fraser critiques Habermas’ conceptualisation 
of the public sphere for being built on communication between particulars ‘as if’ they 
were equal.67 The ‘as if’ assumption ignores the barriers groups might face, such as 
language, resources and information, and can potentially exclude voices and opinions 
of certain groups of society.68 Asking about the demos within deliberative democracy 
                                                            
61 See C. Gould, ‘Self-Determination beyond Sovereignty: Relating Transnational 
Democracy to Local Authority’, (2006) 37(1) Journal of Social Philosophy 44, at 54 
62 J. A. Scholte, ‘Global Governance, accountability and civil society’ in J. A. Scholte 
(ed.), Building Global Democracy? Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance, 
(2011), 8 at 22.  
63 ibid, at 22. 
64 Dryzek, supra note 15, at 24 
65 Wheatley, supra note 59, at 106 
66 See Fraser, supra note 52, at 62 
67 Ibid, at 63 
68 Young, supra note 16, at 54-55 
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can raise difficult questions about who should participate within the consultation and 
the equality between members within that demos. 
 
3.2 Deliberation and Decision-Making 
 
Deliberation, at its broadest, is suggestive of debate and discussion. Within the models 
of deliberative democracy there are particular rules that guide deliberation, which 
include; discussions predicated on reasoned arguments, the idea that no relevant 
actor is excluded from the discourse, everyone has the opportunity to speak, 
individuals should listen to one another and respond to one another, individuals should 
justify their positions to each other, and no one can be coerced.69  
 
Participation and inclusion are common markers of legitimacy within the literature on 
international law and international organisations.70 Though, what participation and 
inclusion mean can vary. For Kuper inclusion refers to the range of actors from 
different social backgrounds,71 and for Teubner the utility of participation and inclusion 
is the plurality.72 In essence, these ideas of participation and inclusion speak to the 
scope of participation, or the number and variation of participants. It is this form of 
participation-based legitimacy that the Bank appeals to in its promotional and 
                                                            
69 S. Chambers, ‘Discourse and democratic practices’, in Stephen K White (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Habermas (1995), 233 at 239 
70 Kleinlein, supra note 4, at 41 and 44 
71 A. Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global 
Institutions (2006), at 166 
72 G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization 
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informative literature on the ESF. The standard of deliberative democracy is more 
complicated. 
 
For Habermas, deliberation means ‘[a]ll interested parties should have an equal 
opportunity to exercise influence in the process of bargaining, “so that all the affected 
interests can come into play and have equal chances of prevailing”’.73 This can be 
broken down into two potentialities: firstly, equal opportunity to participate and 
secondly, equal chance of their views prevailing. Crucially, within deliberative 
democracy, the deliberations must feed into the act of decision-making; it is through 
reasoned arguments that participants convince one another to form a consensus.74 
 
Although deliberative democracy has been championed in scholarship on global 
governance, these potentialities within Habermas’ the theory weaken the utility of 
deliberative democracy for consultation processes such as the World Bank’s reform 
of the ESF. The potential of equal opportunity and of prevailing can be undermined by 
power-dynamics. Equal opportunity to participate and to prevail at their weakest mean 
that in principle deliberations must be open to those affected.75 Young would go further 
and argue for genuine participation, exposing the obstacles that participants might 
face when participating.76 For example, Young highlights how location, language and 
resources can act as barriers to participation and how voices can be patronised for not 
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meeting a prerequisite standard of rationality.77 Habermas argues that participants 
have an equal chance of their opinion prevailing.78 Arguably, this means that within 
deliberative democracy no one actor should be able to claim an advantage.79 
However, this ignores power dynamics within the demos, where some actors can exert 
leverage over the decision-making.80 For example, Levy has demonstrated how ‘elite’ 
actors, which could include civil servants and policy-makers, have power to shape 
deliberative processes.81 The potential of equality of opportunity and of prevailing raise 
a limitation of deliberative democracy; this model of democracy cannot provide 
guarantees that people’s views will be taken into account. Given this weakness, it is 
questionable whether deliberative democracy is an appropriate standard for the World 
Bank consultation process.  
 
Combining the component parts of deliberative democracy with these critiques, offers 
a rich set of challenges for international decision-making. When outlined, deliberative 
democracy sets a high threshold; it includes the efficacy of the public-sphere and a 
genuine connection between the demos, the process of deliberation and the act of 
decision-making. The critiques, often from feminist theorists, expose how deliberative 
democracy brackets differences between actors and overlooks potential power-
dynamics, which are critical challenges within international decision-making. The next 
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section will use both the components of deliberative democracy and these critiques to 
analyse the World Bank consultation on the ESF.  
 
 
4. Deliberative Democracy and the World Bank Safeguard Reform 
 
4.1 The World Bank ESF demos 
 
Using the ‘all-affected’ principle to demarcate a demos, raises questions about the 
types of actors participating in the ESF consultation. The ESF impacts on a number of 
different categories of persons, and therefore potentially “affects” a range of actors. 
The World Bank ESF, the ESS and the Policy for Investment Project Financing is 
directed at borrowing states, the Bank, and donor states. Within the ESF, there are 
obligations on borrowing states, due diligence obligation for the Bank, and instructions 
on relations with donor states and multilateral or bilateral funding agencies.82 Thus, 
‘affected’ could include borrowing countries, the Bank, and donor countries. These 
actors could be considered to be ‘affected’ because the ESF places obligations on 
them. 
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The ESF also has implications for the countries where the Bank finances projects. This 
means that the ESF affects states in receipt of funding, as well as the communities 
that are both positively and/or adversely affected by the financing of projects.83 
Indigenous peoples are “affected” by the ESF both because Bank-financed projects 
can encroach on their rights, but also because they have participatory rights that are 
protected by the ESF. Within the consultation process, indigenous people had a stake 
in what the ESF would say about the scope of their participatory rights. Other funding 
agencies have to reach ‘materially consistent’ standards with the ESF,84 and it is 
therefore arguable that they have a stake in the content of the ESF. 
 
Attempts to narrow the ‘all-affected’ principle refer to fundamental interests or take into 
account interests that are significantly affected.85 This might exclude other funding 
agencies that were interested in the outcome of ESF reform, but did not have a 
fundamental interest at stake. Yet, these limits on the all-affected principle are 
subjectively defined and could lead to problems in the case of ESF where fundamental 
interests such as human rights, environmental concerns and financial assets are at 
stake.86 Within the ESF, the human rights of project-affected communities are being 
balanced against the financial assets of the Bank and its donor countries, and the 
potential financial interests of borrowing countries.87  
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Discussing the ‘all-affected’ principle as the criterion for demarcating a group of 
relevant actors in the ESF consultation process highlights that increased plurality of 
actors does not necessarily ensure that the interests of the people, represented 
through civil society actors, are protected. In this instance, the Bank’s choice of actors 
balances the interests of communities with the interests of the Bank, borrowing 
countries and donor countries.  
 
When reading the ESF through a democratic lens, a pertinent question is how the 
World Bank constructed the demos. In this World Bank consultation, there is a mixture 
of selection and self-selection. The Bank made decisions on the experts to consult 
and the Participants questioned the Bank’s process for selecting these experts, 
highlighting that experts on gender were not included in aspects of Phase 1.88 The 
Bank selects which actors consult on which questions. For example, in paragraph 35 
of the Approach Paper it states, ‘[t]he Bank will undertake an internal dialogue on these 
areas, followed by consultations with shareholders and external experts’.89 This 
means that there is a range of issues, which includes human rights, gender, disability, 
natural resources and climate change, where the Bank proposed to open consultation 
only to shareholders (i.e. Member States), external experts, and Bank staff. Thus, 
potentially ignoring the views of communities.90 Moreover, as noted above, in Phase 
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2, the Bank selected countries to ensure a balance of middle- and low-income 
economies, and in Phase 3 the Bank concentrated on consulting with government 
officials and implementations units within borrowing countries. 
 
The World Bank set out to be global in scope; the consultation process was supposed 
to engage people, groups, and governments from around the world. Whilst 
stakeholders were invited by the Bank, there was a process for other stakeholders to 
register to attend.91 This online registration process is arguably available to all. 
Importantly, the Bank followed its Consultation Guidelines and examples of 
international good practice on consultations. This meant that consultation meetings 
were advertised in advance. Importantly, the Bank stressed its effort to ensure that its 
processes were accessible to those persons that faced obstacles to participation; ‘[t]he 
World Bank made a special effort to reach out to stakeholders in rural and hard to 
reach areas, such as indigenous groups and people living in rural areas’92 and 
‘[c]onsultation venues were accessible for persons with disabilities’, sign language 
interpreters were available, and copies of the materials were printed in Braille.93 
 
However, summaries and transcripts of the consultation meetings with multiple-
stakeholders highlight the limits of the Bank’s efforts to be inclusionary. There are 
repeated complaints about the short-notice given for consultations,94 and the lack of 
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time to read circulated documentation.95 Participants note the choice of locations for 
some of the consultation meetings were difficult for more rural populations or isolated 
people to attend.96 Comments are made about the lack of translations for local 
languages, creating barriers to participation.97 With respect to disability access, in 
Phase 1 of the consultation, a speaker complained of the lack of facilities for disabled 
persons: 
There were no arrangements made to facilitate the participation of disabled 
persons in this consultation meeting. For example, there were no documents in 
Braille provided for the visually impaired, neither could they have access to the 
Power Point or complete the registration forms. There was no sign language 
interpreter for the hearing impaired. It should not be claimed that these 
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consultation meetings are open and accessible to all if this is in theory only; 
they should be open in real terms.98 
 
Similarly, in Phase 2, there were continued calls for documentation to be made 
available in Braille or enlarged print.99 
 
Moreover, comments from the consultation process highlight that there were peoples 
that did not or could not participate in the consultation process. One participant stated: 
‘I think one of my main concerns throughout this process is that it happened so quickly 
and that the communities are actually not here […]’,100 and another gave the example 
of a community organisation that represents persons impacted by the Chixoy Dam in 
Guatemala, an organisation that was not told about the consultation and were told it 
was ‘too late to attend the multi-stakeholder consultation’ when they tried to register.101 
In Latin America, ‘major indigenous peoples’ organizations were not aware of the 
consultations happening in their countries’.102 Requests for consultations by CSOs 
were left unaddressed by the Bank; for example, one participant argued that the Bank 
had not responded to requests for consultation in Montreal.103 One participant 
highlighted that diaspora communities were not consulted during Phase 1, despite the 
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impact climate change has on those communities,104 and another argued that ‘peasant 
organizations, as well as relevant sub-groups, including small family farmers’ were not 
present in discussions in Paraguay.105 These sorts of comments highlight that voices 
were left out of the consultation process.106 Feminist scholars have highlighted how a 
commitment to equality can work to bracket structural inequalities of power between 
these different actors.107 These comments from the consultation highlight the 
obstacles to genuine participation for certain communities. 
 
To meet the standard of deliberative democracy, the participants in the ESF 
consultation process would need to be ‘all interested parties’,108 but reliance on this 
criterion alone to demarcate the demos is problematic. Focus on demarcating the 
demos using ‘all-affected’ allows for the participation of powerful economic actors and 
communities of people. Deliberative democracy, as a form of procedural legitimisation, 
focused on treating participants ‘as equals’, cannot ensure the protection of 
substantive rights nor a ‘just’ outcome. Merely focusing on demarcating a demos using 
mechanisms such as the ‘all-affected’ criterion, does not expose the unequal power 
dynamics between the Bank, the donors, the borrowing countries, and communities 
and activists, nor the potential barriers to participation for certain groups. 
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This discussion on demos highlights that how the bank chooses its participants for 
consultation needs further research and there needs to be a clearer, normative 
approach to the demarcation of the participants. Going for ‘global’ participation might 
satisfy a plurality participation-focused idea of legitimacy, but the fusion of actors in 
this consultation process raises challenges. Feminist critiques of deliberative 
democracy ask hard questions about who should be included in decision-making 
processes and how much weight should be accorded to their views. Reading the 
process using the feminist critiques of an all-affected principle, exposes the 
inequalities of power that are not necessarily highlighted when discussing deliberative 
democracy. Asking the democracy question necessitates a debate on who should 
have a stake in decisions. Whilst, it might be legitimate for both the Bank and the 
affected communities to have a say in decision-making, it is not necessarily a just 
outcome that more powerful actors have an ‘equal’ say to the persons that the ESF 
was designed to project. 
 
4.2 Deliberation and Decision-Making in the ESF consultation process 
 
The Bank in its consultation exercise did construct processes that provide 
opportunities for a range of actors to participate. As noted above, consideration was 
given to access requirements for persons and the Bank made efforts to reach rural 
communities.109 There were a wealth of town-hall meetings that provided space for 
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participation, and video links were used as a means of extending the participation. The 
sheer scale of participation, as well as the plurality of actors from a range of social and 
economic backgrounds that were involved, is praiseworthy.  
 
However, mere inclusion and participation are not sufficient for deliberative 
democracy. Deliberative democracy calls for an understanding of how these groups 
of people participated.110 For deliberative democracy, there must be a genuine 
connection between the deliberative exercises and the act of decision-making; it is not 
sufficient for mere deliberation to take place. Deliberative democracy calls for 
discussions and debates between actors, as the idea is that actors can convince each 
other to form a consensus. An equal opportunity to participate and an equal 
opportunity to prevail in deliberations, underpins deliberative democracy.  
 
If those are the ideal standards necessitated by deliberative democracy, then the 
summarised or transcribed comments from the consultation process expose problems 
with the deliberations in the ESF consultation. Consultations were often short and did 
not facilitate deliberation as understood within deliberative democracy. The quality of 
the consultation was criticised by participants, as the length of meetings was too short 
and there was not sufficient time to discuss all the issues.111 Another concern that was 
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repeated throughout the process, was that the consultation process did not allow 
deliberation between stakeholders; meetings with government representations were 
held separately from the consultation meetings with ‘multi-stakeholders’, often 
members of CSOs.112 Holding separate meetings obscures reasoned debates 
between participants, where actors learn from each other and can adapt to reach a 
consensus. 
 
Civil society actors and Indigenous Peoples were concerned that their comments were 
not given weight by the Bank.113 One participant argues that the Bank ignored calls 
from certain community groups, offering ‘insensitive responses’ to the ‘pleas’ from 
people affected by Bank-supported projects in Guatemala, Cambodia, Ethiopia and 
Indonesia.114 As the meetings were held with Chatham House rules, and often 
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summarised, it is difficult to assess whether some participants dominated proceedings 
over others, but it is pointed out that meetings with CSO consultation were shorter 
than the meetings with governments.115 Commentary on the meeting in Jakarta states 
that the meeting was ‘dominated by nongovernmental and CSO organisations’, at the 
expense of other parties that had been invited.116 These critiques demonstrate that the 
consultation was not predicated on an equal opportunity to participate. 
 
The decisions on the ESF were ultimately taken by the Bank management, namely 
the Development Committee, and approval of the final draft of the ESF was sought 
from the Board of Executive Directors at the Bank. The Bank acknowledged that 
consensus between the varying shareholders and stakeholders was difficult to find. 
There were two prominent methods the Bank used to reconcile differences between 
stakeholders: one method was to ‘prioritized implementability’, whilst seeking to 
improve the coverage of environmental and social issues,117 and another was to argue 
that negotiation was guided by the Bank’s mandate.118 
 
With respect to ‘implementability’, as a principle of reconciliation, there are clear 
examples where the Bank has weakened provisions so as to accommodate the 
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concerns of those Borrowing countries implementing the ESSs. For example, in 
relation to the freedom of association and collective bargaining of workers, borrowing 
countries argued that there was inconsistency with national laws, and so the Bank 
‘clarifies that the objective of supporting the principles of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining of workers would be required in a manner consistent with national 
law’.119 Borrowing countries argued that the costs of estimating greenhouse gases is 
too onerous, 120 and the Bank placed limits on what was expected of borrowing 
countries.121 Similarly, in relation to Indigenous Peoples’ FPIC, borrowing countries 
feared this would amount to a veto, so the Bank ‘clarified that, for the purpose of ESS7 
[on Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Undeserved Traditional 
Local Communities], consent refers to the collective support of affected Indigenous 
Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities 
for the project activities that affect them, reached through a culturally appropriate 
process’.122 This means that projects can go ahead even if some groups or individuals 
disagree.123 The Bank states that it was responding to ‘Indigenous Peoples’ interest in 
FPIC’,124 but this is disingenuous to the support of and call for strong FPIC during the 
consultation process.125 Although it is arguable that within deliberative democracy 
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participants cannot claim a privileged position,126 within the ESF reform process the 
borrowing countries had decision-making power, rather than the communities.  
 
The Bank’s Mandate is used as another tool for reconciliation, specifically in the 
debate on the incorporation of international human rights standards. The Bank states: 
The multiple and sometimes conflicting voices that claim to represent 
stakeholders’ interests can lead to a polarized debate, and make it difficult to 
find consensus. The Bank will seek to strike the right balance, guided by its 
mandate, its overall development objectives, and implementation 
considerations.127 
 
In the Management’s Response to the third consultation phase, it states: 
Consistency with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement was also raised as a major 
concern. Given the divergent views on human rights coverage in the ESF 
among shareholders and stakeholders, Management suggests that the current 
approach, addressing human rights in the Vision statement, be maintained.128  
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Alston (and Human Rights Watch in their submission),129 highlight the extent of 
stakeholders and interested parties petitioning for the inclusion of human rights.130 
There is a debate on whether the Bank should have incorporated human rights, which 
will not be expanded upon here as this article is concerned with the process. Despite 
the calls by civil society actors, the Banks’ mandate prevailed. Any deliberation that 
could be said to ‘take into account’ the interests and concerns of participating 
stakeholders is weighed against the Bank’s mandate. In other words, the decision 
reached is not necessarily led by the concerns of participants, but rather potentially 
trammelled by the Bank’s mandate. Human rights provisions within the ESF are an 
example of how in this World Bank consultation process, the negotiation and 
agreement is not reached through discussions between people and/or their 
representatives so as to reach consensus through rational debate,131 but instead 
agreement is reached by the Bank management. 
 
The Bank’s mandate evolves. It can be currently understood as: 
[t]he World Bank promotes long-term economic development and poverty 
reduction by providing technical and financial support to help countries reform 
certain sectors or implement specific projects—such as building schools and 
health centers, providing water and electricity, fighting disease, and protecting 
the environment.132  
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Zweifel points out that in 2006 the Bank’s mandate is interpreted as to ‘fight poverty 
and improve living standards for people living in the developing world’.133 Scholars 
have highlighted the shifting politicisation of the World Bank as it strives to 
accommodate global challenges, not least the 2008 economic crisis;134 some scholars 
argue that the reduction of poverty is a rouse to introduce liberal economics,135 and 
others emphasise the Bank’s competitiveness within a market of lenders, which results 
in the balancing of poverty reduction with profits.136 Note also the shift from improving 
people’s living to helping countries, which could be suggestive of a move to prioritise 
the developing countries over the interests of the people living there. In theory, if 
decisions are being made to ensure the reduction of poverty or the improvement of 
living-conditions, this is in favour of the communities within developing countries. 
However, the mandate is currently interpreted to refer to helping developing countries, 
rather than specifically the lives of their people. Another instance of the borrowing 
counties potentially having more leverage in the decisions on ESF reform and of elites, 
such as Bank staff, shaping the deliberations.  
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Reliance on the mandate and on implementability as tools for reconciliation does not 
allow the people themselves to decide.137 Deliberative democracy necessitates a 
genuine link between deliberations and the act of decision-making, and that link is 
broken in this consultation process. Under the deliberative democracy model, the 
decision reached should be one that all participants could agree. For Habermas, 
consensus means that the decision is based on arguments that ‘convince parties in 
the same way’.138 Although this is a highly idealistic threshold, it expresses the crucial 
role of the people in the act of decision-making.139 Using deliberative democracy as a 
lens exposes the gap between the deliberations and the act of decision-making, 
demonstrating that the weaker role for people within international decision-making. 
 
The commitment to homogeneity within deliberative democracy would treat all 
participants as equal,140 and in the case of the ESF consultation process, it would treat 
donors, borrowers, Bank representatives, civil society representatives, and affected 
communities as equals. Yet, the demos constructed by the World Bank is far from 
homogenous and is rather constituted of a series of inequitable power struggles. For 
example, struggles between donor states and borrowing states,141 and also between 
borrowing countries, the Bank and the communities adversely affected by investment 
projects. This article exposes the Bank’s deference to borrowing countries despite 
donor countries and civil society actors calling for greater protection in areas such as 
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human rights and discrimination.142 As these actors are considered to be ‘equal’ under 
deliberative democracy,143 there are no mechanisms to ensure that the views of the 
people are heard, taken into account and acted upon. Within deliberative democracy, 
people’s views cannot be explicitly prioritised above others,144 even though the 
borrowing states held more sway in this reform process, and rural or isolated groups 
were denied genuine access to consultation meetings. 
 
The process leading up to the adoption of the Bank’s ESF is laudable in its attempt to 
engage internal and external stakeholders on a global scale. However, if a model of 
deliberative democracy is used, there are questions about the quality of discussions 
in the consultations, the role of the different actors in the consultation process and the 
respective weight they had in decision-making. Discussing deliberative democracy, 
and its critiques, exposes the problems within the reform process. It exposes the 
inequalities of power between participants and the prevailing gulf between 
communities of people and international decision-making.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The World Bank consultation process on the ESF is a genuine attempt to strive for 
global-wide participatory decision-making. The plethora of non-state actors involved, 
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the breadth of countries that participated, and the intensity of the three-phase 
consultation are admirable. Focusing on whether this World Bank consultation process 
could be explained as an exercise in deliberative democracy, this article highlighted 
the types of debates that scholars need to have to discuss deliberative democracy 
within global governance. 
 
This article exposed a number of problems with the ESF consultation process. It 
highlighted the problems of trying to construct a demos for a consultation process with 
multiple potential stakeholders, with competing interests, and diverging amounts of 
leverage within decision-making. In striving for global participation, or even to 
incorporate those affected by the ESF, the World Bank draws together a demos that 
differs widely in terms of their respective powers; borrowers and donors, bank staff 
and communities, as well as activists and civil society are treated as if they were equal. 
Comments from civil society actors during the consultation process expose the weak 
nature of the deliberation: there were people who could be said to be affected by the 
ESF that were not there; civil society actors were kept separate from government 
actors; and, time constraints meant less opportunities for informed debates. Looking 
at how the Bank made attempts to reconcile the opinions of different actors, highlights 
the gaps between the deliberations and the act of decision-making. The World Bank 
consultation process falls short of the ideal of deliberative democracy, but there is still 
something to be learned from talking about these sorts of consultation processes 
through a lens of deliberative democracy.  
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By using deliberative democracy to analyse the World Bank consultation process, this 
article uncovers the uncomfortable questions around the types of actors invited to 
participate and their respective powers in the decision-making process. Critiques of 
deliberative democracy highlight the extent to which the model ignores power 
dynamics, brackets questions of difference, and seeks to homogenise the demos 
through an idea of equality. The weaknesses of the Bank’s consultation process on 
ESF highlight the challenges that are still faced in relation to power-struggles and 
injustices within international decision-making. There is still more that needs to be 
done to integrate people and communities into decision-making. Asking about 
deliberative democracy can uncover these power-dynamics. Moreover, scholarship 
that strives to find examples of democratic decision-making should be mindful of the 
difficult questions that need to be addressed about the people participating in 
deliberations and their respective powers.  
